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Recent years have seen a sharp growth in the number of regional agreements both concluded 
and under negotiation. This paper attempts to document and discuss this growth focusing on 
US, EU, Chinese, Indian and other agreements. The form, coverage, and content of these 
agreements varies considerably from case to case. The paper asks why so many, why the 
variation in form, and why the recent acceleration. Implications for the trading system are 
discussed in a final section. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last few years there has been a sharp growth in the number of regional trade 
agreements both concluded and under negotiation. Data from the WTO Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements discussed below confirm this trend. Countries such as 
Singapore with effectively no tariff have negotiated an extensive treaty network with 
around 11 bilateral partners. Countries which for decades had avoided participation in 
regional agreements, such as Japan, have in the last 3 years initiated or concluded a 
growing number of agreements. Countries such as China who acceded to the WTO in 
2002 and pledged themselves to multilateralism, in 2002, have within a few years 
negotiated 8 separated agreements
2. Other countries, such as India, who for several 
decades limited themselves only to minimal agreements with immediate smaller 
neighbors have initiated or discussed bilateral negotiation with partners further away
3. 
This paper has two objectives. One is to understand more fully what this growth in 
agreements implies. They represent growing numbers of agreements across regional 
groupings, as well as across developed and developing countries; a widening variance in 
form, from initial limited framework agreements to deeper partnership agreements going 
well beyond trade; a sharp growth in coverage beyond goods and services into such areas 
as mutual recognition, competition policy, movement of persons, investment, and 
cooperation agreements; and a focus on trade management (or process) establishing 
                                                 
2 See Appendix 1: Country Specific Summary Tables to Antkiewicz, Agata and John Whalley. BRICSAM 
and the non-WTO. CIGI working Paper No. 3, 2005.  
Http://www.cigionline.org/publications/docs/BRICSAM_Non-WTO_new.pdf 
3 The list of India’s current bilateral negotiation partners is Afghanistan, ASEAN, Bhutan, Chile, Mongolia, 
Nepal, Singapore, Sri Lank and Thailand. See the webpage maintained by India’s Ministry of Commerce: 
http:// commerce.nic.in/India_rta_main.htm. And Roy, Jayanta. “ South Asian Regional Trade Agreements: 
Perspectives, Issues and Options.” Paper presented at the International Trade Roundtable “The WTO at 10 
years- the regional Challenge to Multilateralism, Brussels, Belgium, June 27, 2005.   3
procedures for joint exchanges, coordination and other actions as well as joint limitation 
on the use of trade restricting instruments ( such as tariffs). Much of this is reflected in a 
renaming of these agreements away from the term trade agreement towards wider forms 
of agreement (the recent Japan-Singapore agreement is for a New Age Economic 
Partnership Agreement). And the traditional Venetian focus on trade creation and trade 
diversion in evaluating their effects often seems irrelevant, since that the majority of 
these agreements involve instances where the bilateral trade at issue is small compared to 
the joint trade with other  partners, and in many cases agreement partners are trade rivals 
in third markets. 
The second objective is to try to attempt to make some sense of all of these 
developments. Why are there so many, why are they so varied, why are they occurring 
now? The world of the GATT at its creation in 1947 was effectively free of regional 
arrangements, while the world of the late 1870’s was one (in Europe at least) of extensive 
regionalism
4. I suggest that the latest wave in these agreements appears to reflect a range 
of factors. There is the demonstration effect of the largest trading entity in the world, the 
US,  going regional with its lag at trading partner first in the 1987 Canadian agreement 
and then more broadly in NAFTA in 1991, and hence being open to regional negotiation. 
There is the subsequent dynamic interplay between regional and multilateral negotiation 
regional negotiation and agreements aiming to influence multilateral outcomes at the end 
of the Uruguay Round and later. Subsequently, it has been the failure of attempts to 
broaden multilateral negotiation into non trade areas such as competition policy and 
investment that have created the opportunity for regional arrangements to evolve through 
                                                 
4 See Estevadeordal, Antoni, Brian Frantz, and Alan M. Taylor. The Rise and Fall of World Trade 1870-
1939. NBER Working Paper No. W9318, 2002.   4
targeted sub group negotiation. And once the wave of regionalism has been initiated, the 
career opportunities for negotiators completing regional agreements and the uses for 
politicians of trade treaties which demonstrate action to electorates has further fueled 
their growth. 
The paper concludes by discussing the future for regional arrangements as the Doha 
Round draws to a seemingly minimalist and inconsequential conclusion. The paradox 
posed is one of regional (and primarily bilateral) agreements as seemingly left as the area 
of dynamism for new global integration in terms of number and coverage of agreements, 
while at the same time being viewed by many researchers as largely diplomatic and of 
limited substance relative to multilateral disciplines embedded in the WTO. 
   5
2. The Growth of Regional Agreements 
When the GATT was negotiated in 1947 and came into force in 1948 there were 
effectively no regional agreements in the world trading system. There were systems of 
trade preferences, most notably the commonwealth preferences agreed to at the 1932 
Ottawa conference, but no formal regional trade agreements. There had in the past been 
extensive regional agreements in Europe, centered on the UK-France Cobden- Chevalier 
treaty of 1870
5. This treaty had the feature that it extended to each party to the agreement 
the benefits of any subsequent negotiation with third parties (what today we call MFN), 
and became the cornerstone of an intricate system of interlinked bilateral agreements in 
Europe, many of which subsequent attempted to be exclusionary of other parties despite 
the intent of the original treaty. This system grew extensively throughout Europe prior to 
1913, but with the war effectively ceased. Importantly the US position during this period 
was one of hostility to regional agreements which were seen as a central element of 
colonial power centered on Europe and from which the US had been excluded since 
independence. 
In 1947 regional agreements were touched on only lightly in the negotiation of the 
GATT articles. Article 24 was agreed to allowing members to participate in regional 
agreements under the two conditions that broadly all trade between parties would be 
covered (usually interpreted since as covering at least 80% of trade) and that no barriers 
should be raised against third parties as a regional agreement takes effect. Article 24 was 
as much intended to deal with cases of dissolution of nation states (such as the 1905 
                                                 
5 See Lazer, David. The Free Trade Epidemic of the 1860s and Other Outbreaks of Economic 
Discrimination. World Politics 51.4 (1999): 447-483 and Estevadeordal, Antoni, Brian Frantz, and Alan M. 
Taylor. The Rise and Fall of world Trade 1870-1939, NBER Working Paper No. W9318, 2002.   6
separation of Sweden and Norway) as it was to cover new trade agreements between 
existing states.  
  The world of today is a substantial distance from 1947 as far as regional agreements 
are concerned. The US, the major trading power in the system, and the champion of 
multilateralism for the first four decades of the GATT, effectively went regional with 
Canada, its largest trading partner, in 1987 in an agreement initiated from the Canadian 
side, and later trilateralized into the NAFTA in 1991
6. But since 2000, the US has 
concluded Free Trade Agreements with Australia, Chile, Jordon, Omen, Morocco, 
Singapore, Peru, and the six Central American parties to CAFTA (Costa Rica,   
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua). The US is 
presently negotiating FTA’s with a dozen or so further countries including Korea, 
Panama, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Andean Community (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Venezuela), FTAA (Free Trade Area of Americas), and the SACU countries (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland)
7.            
The European Union, whose formation under the 1957 Treaty of Rome provided one 
of the major elements of escalation of regionalism in the system, has also seen a sharp 
recent escalation in its regional agreements. Beginning in the 1990’s previous EU 
development efforts focused on aid and assistance, primarily to former European colonies, 
began to take on the form of providing a trade, investment, and legal framework for 
European companies to do business in these countries
8. Through a series of partnership 
agreements the EU approach to regional agreements has been for partner countries to 
                                                 
6 There was an earlier US-Israel agreement in 1985, but this was more limited in scope and had geopolitical 
strategic underpinnings more so than primarily trade policy objectives. 
7 See the website of the US Government: http:// www.export.gov/fta/index.asp. 
8 See Kaya, Ayse. The USA’s and the EU’s Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements: Divergent Paths, 
Divergent Ends? Working Paper 2005.   7
adopt similar laws and policies to those in the EU that relate to both trade and the wider 
conduct of business. Agreements cover intellectual property, labor practices, competition 
policy, investment, culture, and movement of persons to the EU.  Some are cooperation 
agreements, some association agreements, some framework agreements. In some cases 
they are phased agreements seen as part of possible eventual accession to the EU; in other 
cases they are stand alone agreements. Recent agreements span the Cotonou Agreement 
of 2000 with 76 African, Caribbean, and Pacific former colonies (formerly the Lome 
Agreement), 2002 Agreements with Algeria, Chile, Jordon, Lebanon; 2001 Agreements 
with Algeria, Egypt, Korea and Bangladesh, a 2004 Agreement with Syria, and a 2005 
Agreement with Iran
9. These agreements are in addition to the regional arrangement, 
reflected in the latest enlargement of the EU to 25 member states. 
Elsewhere the pace of new regional arrangements has been equally rapid. Singapore, 
effectively a free trade zone with almost no barriers to trade, since 1998 has embarked on 
an extensive programme of building a network of regional agreement. Seen as 
cooperation agreements that go well beyond conventional trade agreements, there are 
now 11 of these
10. China, relatively rapidly after acceding to the WTO in 2002, has 
concluded regional agreements and wider cooperation agreements with Hong Kong, 
Macau, ASEAN, New Zealand, Australia, Chile, Pakistan and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, and is now negotiating with India, Singapore, and others
11. Japan, long with no 
                                                 
9 See the webpage: http:// ec.europa.eu/comm./external_relations/index.htm and 
http://www.acpsec.org/en/conventions/cotonou/accord1.htm. 
10 See Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore: http://app.fta.gov.sg/asp/fta/ourfta.asp. Singapore also 
has involved in the ongoing negotiation with Bahrain, Canada, Egypt, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, 
Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates and in ASEAN negotiation with China, Australia and New 
Zealand, India, Japan (in an extension to a previous agreement) and Korea.   
11 China also has ongoing negotiations with Thailand, APEC (Asian Pacific), East Asia (Japan, Korea), 
Brazil, India, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, SACU (South Africa), Mercosur (South America), Iceland, Japan 
and Korea.    8
regional agreements now has a series of concluded agreements with Singapore, ASEAN 
and others.  India is a further country joining this trend with new regional agreements 
with ASEAN and Singapore. 
As of September 2005, 334 regional trade agreements had been notified to the WTO 
committee on regional trade agreements, and of those notified 183 were still in force. 
Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) document this growth in notifications in the GATT from 
0 between 1943 and 1957, and calculate that by 2008, if RTAs, at a negotiation, proposal, 
or actually signed (but not yet notified) stage are included the number of agreements in 
force will grow to 300. Crawford and Fiorentino also include in their paper global maps 
showing the frequency (number) of agreements with 30 or more agreements in some 
European countries, most of North America and Latin America with 10-19 agreements, 
and other regions between 4 and 10. By any stretch of the imagination this constitutes a 
sharp and recent acceleration in regionalism in the trading system. 
  However, evaluating both its content and significance is a daunting task. Some 
agreements relate to bilateral or regional links where trade flows and other forms of 
economic interaction are limited (India-Afghanistan, US-Oman), others apply to cases 
where linkages are deeper. Some agreements seem to be token sane while others are more 
substantive. Moreover, WTO multilateral disciplines remain as the anchor of the trading 
system, and how far these agreements go beyond what is already implied by WTO 
agreements is of unclear. Since WTO negotiating rounds have progressively lowered 
bound tariffs, it is often assumed the scope for substantive regional agreements with 
impact in the tariff sphere has become more limited.   9
This wide variation in form and circumstance leads to sharply divergent evaluations of 
their impact. One school of though highlights the increasing difficulties in the WTO 
Doha Round and its likely minimalist outcome, along with the growing difficulties of 
dispute settlement in multilateral process. It thus sees this growth in regionalism 
potentially as the leading edge of future negotiated global integration. But the contrary 
view suggests that many are negotiated for diplomatic reasons or even personal 
advancement of negotiators, and/or  politicians. The characterization is one of bilateral 
froth sitting on top of substantive multilateralism. It also highlights the much larger 
potential number of bilateral agreements (Factorial 180) then those we actually now 
have
12. 
Neither simple characterization is, in my view, appropriate; both have elements of 
plausibility and both need to be considered given that few substantive evaluations of 
individual agreements exist in the literature where both the texts of agreements and their 
substantive content are jointly evaluated. The use of gravity or GTAP models for the 
analysis of impacts of the tariff barrier change components may yield little if the 
agreements are complex and elaborate. A recent World Bank (Global Economic 
Prospects 2005) estimate is that perhaps around 43% of world trade was covered by 
agreements in force in 2003 and was projected to increase to 55% by 2005 (OECD, 
2003)
13. But such calculations only raise more questions. How large are the impacts of 
these agreements on covered trade?
14  How large are the preference margins in these 
                                                 
12 With 191 UN countries, if the potential number of agreements is factorial 191, this yields 1.85 E+354. 
13 See the World Bank. Global Economic Prospects-Trade Regionalism, and Development 2005 OECD, 
Regionalism and the Multilateral Trading System- The Role of regional trade agreements, Policy Brief, 
2003. 
14 In the case of Canada – US trade there are estimates that perhaps 70% of bilateral trade eligible for 
preferential tariff treatment takes place without eligible preferences being claimed because MFN tariffs are   10
agreements compared to no agreement situations? How significant are the non trade 
components of these agreements in a range of newly covered areas (services, IP, 
investment, movement of persons, mutual recognition, and competition policy).    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
any way  low and the costs of establishing origin p are often prohibitively large for exporters. See policy 
Research Initiative Discussion Paper June 2005, P 16.   11
3.  An Overview  of the Content of recent regional agreements    
        Evaluating both the impact of and potential future significance of recent regional 
agreements, in my view, requires some form of synthesis of what these agreements 
actually are since most go well beyond the tariff barrel agreements studied by economic 
theorists. By way of example the 2002 US-Singapore bilateral agreement is 210 pages of 
text and 1375 pages of annexes; with a 299 page annex on rules of origin
15. The 1987 
Canada-US bilateral agreement contains 23 chapters and covers a wide range of items 
including energy security, financial services, wine and spirits, special dispute settlement 
covering bilateral use of anti dumping and countervailing duties, compensation for losses 
to foreigners from government actions, and other matters
16. 
One way to approach these agreements is as tariff plus agreements, and recognize that 
in many cases the plus component dominates the tariff part in length of text and likely in 
significance given that in many cases the MFN tariff rates are sufficiently low that the 
margins of preference involved have limited impacts on trade.  
But a further element in assessing these agreements is to recognize their significance as 
process rather than simply instrument based agreements that limit the use of trade based 
interventions (tariffs). The 1957 Treaty of Rome set out a road map for ever deeper 
integration in Europe moving initially from joint tariff removed among partners on to a 
tax union and eventually to economic and monetary union a common currency, a 
common budgetary and competition policy structure, and beyond. As such it stands in 
sharp contrast to the 1991 NAFTA which is a one off agreement that does not set out an 
ongoing process for North American economic integration. 
                                                 
15 See http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html.  
16 See http://wehner.tamu.edu/mgmt.www/NAFTA/fta/index.htm.    12
Several in recent regional agreements, and especially those of China and Japan, are 
centrally labeled as cooperation and partnership agreements. Commitments are set out to 
cooperate in tourism, rural development, standards setting, and in other areas including 
poverty alleviation and the promotion of mutual understanding. Tariff arrangements are 
thus but one part of these agreements. Some agreements also contain broad commitments 
to cut tariffs, but with details to be subsequently negotiated. In some cases, agreements 
on rules of origin, and even bilateral dispute settlement are to follow the concluded broad 
agreements
17. And the move into newer areas not covered by current WTO disciplines (or 
current or prospective negotiations) such as standards setting, competition issues, mutual 
recognition and other areas is reflected in the language used to label agreements. The 
recent Japan-Singapore agreement is a “New Age Economic Partnership” agreement, for 
instance; and the China-ASEAN agreement is a Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
18.  
Having noted this tendency for regional agreements to evolve as formalized 
management arrangements for bilateral economic interaction, more so than treaty based 
agreements to mutually limit the use of border measures, a further striking feature is the 
diversity among the agreements themselves. 
In part this is reflected in the sharply differing focus of agreements across the partners 
involved. Many are agreements between countries of sharply asymmetric size, and these 
agreements often follow a seemingly standardized pattern common to other agreements 
involving the larger partner. For instance, both US and EU agreements typically follow a 
standard pattern and form. In contrast, China’s recent agreements (see Antkiewicz and 
                                                 
17 For example, the China-ASEAN Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation. See 
www.aseansec.org  
18 See ASEAN website: http://www.aseansec.org/4979.htm.    13
Whalley (2005)) seem to be more customized to individual partners and perceived 
Chinese opportunities in each bilateral negotiation. 
US agreements are perhaps most simply characterized as following an architecture in 
which the central element offered from the US side is bilateral elimination of remaining 
industrial tariffs (or effectively acceleration of what may be anticipated to subsequently 
occur multilaterally). This is viewed from the US side as proportionally more beneficial 
to the smaller partner, and so in return what is typically requested is what usually 
amounts to unilateral liberalization in key service sectors (banking, insurance, telecoms)
19 
by the smaller partners. These elements of liberalization are then qualified (rules of origin, 
safeguards, sectoral exemptions) and new elements added to these agreements going 
beyond tariffs on industrial products and commitments in services (IP, competition)
20. 
They are seen as one off agreements, and among the present set of agreements globally, 
perhaps least process oriented. 
EU agreements differ substantially from US agreements. Most have their origins in 
changes in thinking in the European Commission in the early 1990’s that relationships 
with former colonies need to evolve away from aid and direct assistance and more 
towards arrangements allowing for easier transactions for European business with these 
states. This is seen as a source of mutual benefit; both development enhancing and pro 
European business. Thus the focus of these agreements is jointly on improving access to 
these markets by removing or weakening border measures and improving the 
environment for European business once inside the national border. Legal structure, 
                                                 
19 Key service sectors also include: computer and related services, energy, etc. see the website of Vietnam 
Government. http:// www.vietnamembassy-usa.org/news/story.php?d=20060515105449&print=yes  
20 See the World Bank study http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=984; the report from Third 
World Network http:// www.twnside.org.sg/title2/par/mk005.doc and 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Section_Index.html    14
competition policy, standards, and other such arrangements are all key. EU agreements, 
in turn, and in contrast to US agreements, are characterized by a series of hierarchical 
partnership agreements through which partner countries can progress. In some cases this 
is seen as part of the transitional process to eventual EU accession. EU agreements have 
been dominated since the 1990’s by agreements either with former Soviet republics and 
with former colonies, but in the last 5 years agreements with partners outside this group 
of countries have been added, most notably with Mercosur and with South Africa. These 
agreements take on a somewhat different form reflecting both the different bargaining 
power and interests of these partners. 
  Elsewhere, China’s agreements negotiated since accession to the WTO are quite 
different one from another and seemingly customized to each partner. No common 
template is involved. Singapore sees itself as the hub for an emerging network of regional 
agreements (even with effectively zero tariffs) which centrally involve intellectual 
property, product standards and other matters. India has begun active regional negotiation 
outside South Asia
21. Chile, Canada, and others are all active. 
A feature of many of the larger country agreements is the seeming clear tie in both to 
multilateral negotiating process, and also the use of sequential bilateral or regional 
negotiation. For instance, the failure of the 1990 ministerial in Brussels meant to 
conclude the GATT Uruguay Round on schedule was followed within a week by a US 
declaration to launch regional negotiations in the Western hemisphere as a way of 
exerting pressure on the EU and others for multilateral conclusion. Also, as a further 
                                                 
21 India’s current engagement in bilateral negotiation include ASEAN, Singapore, Thailand Malaysia, 
Indonesia, SACU, Chile, Mauritius, GCC, MERCOSUR, BIMSTEC, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka (Korea, Japan, Chin-joint study group). See http://commerce.nic.in/india_rta_main.htm Chile’s 
engagement in RTA regional negotiation includes Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Central America, Colombia, 
Ecuador, EFTA, EU, Korea, Mercosur, Mexico, New Zealand-Singapore-Brunei, Peru, US and Venezuela.    15
example the US seemingly first negotiated bilateral agreements with the seeming simple 
cases of Chile and Singapore before moving onto larger partners. Singapore was largely 
duty free, and Chilean exports to the US were largely of copper and out of season fruit 
and vegetables. Establishing precedents in early regional forms of agreements, made it 
easier to move on to a second set of larger entities; Australia, Morocco, CAFTA, SACU; 
presumably with the intent of eventually approaching larger negotiations such as 
Mercosur , India, or China with an established treaty network in place. The EU, also 
notably, has yet to conclude regional agreements (with the exception of Mercosur) with 
its most significant non European /non colonial entities. The content of each regional 
agreement in part this seemingly reflects a dynamic bargaining process involving many 
agreements in the entire sequence.           16
4.  Beyond Goods and Services; the example of ASEAN and ASEAN countries 
agreements.
22 
     Many of the agreements which make up the wave of recent RTA’s go substantially 
beyond conventional free trade agreements in dealing with items not yet subject to WTO 
disciplines and viewing FTA’s as still largely concerned with goods and services is no 
longer in keeping with contemporary realities. They have instead, like multilateral WTO 
negotiations, become platforms for packaging a range of new and ongoing issues 
previously dealt with separately (such as visas / work permits) into a combined 
negotiation. These additional issues added to the trade negotiation differ both between 
multilateral and regional negotiations, and across individual regional negotiations.  
The number and complexity of these agreements makes synthesizing their 
features a non-trivial task, and so I now discuss only a subset of recent agreements 
involving both ASEAN as a single entity, and individual ASEAN countries negotiating 
separately (Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore). ASEAN at this point has concluded three 
formal framework agreements (with China, Japan, and India) and aims to active more 
substantive arrangements and has a further 2 (with Korea, and Australia & New Zealand 
jointly) under negotiation. Singapore has concluded 6 substantive agreements (with the 
US, EFTA, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Jordan) and is negotiating a further 12. 
Thailand has concluded 2 full agreements (with Australia, Bahrain), 2 framework 
agreements (with the US, India), 1 ancillary agreement to a wider ASEAN agreement 
only covering vegetable and fruits (with China), and is negotiating a further 5 agreements. 
Malaysia has a single bilateral investment treaty with the US, but is negotiating a further 
                                                 
22 This section draws in part on Dayaratna Banda and Whalley (2006).   17
5 agreements.  These agreements vary greatly in length, specificity and coverage; some 
are detailed with substantial specificity (especially the Singapore-US agreement). 
What is striking about them as a set is their breadth of coverage. Several areas 
beyond current WTO disciplines are dealt with including competition policy, mutual 
recognition (both of professional qualifications and product standards and testing), 
movement of persons and visa/work permit arrangements, investment, and cooperation in 
specific areas.  
Of the ASEAN blocwide and regional agreements, six contain provisions relating 
to competition policy; Singapore-US, Singapore-EFTA, Singapore-New Zealand, 
Singapore - Australia, Singapore-Japan, and Thailand-Australia. The two ASEAN 
agreements (with China and India) have no coverage of competition policy. Singapore at 
the time of negotiation with the US had no formal competition law, but is now in the 
process of enacting such laws. 
The ways in which competition policy is dealt with in these agreements varies 
from case to case. The most detailed treatment occurs in the Singapore-US agreement, 
and is set out in a 8 page chapter (12) not titled competition policy but instead “Anti 
Competitive Business Conduct, Designated Monopolies and Government Enterprises”. 
This chapter commingles broad statements of principles on matters related to competition 
policy and detailed and specific commitments by the two parties on a range of 
competition related matters.  
Other agreements cover competition in less detail, and with some variation. The 
Thai-Australia agreement commits both governments to actually apply their competition 
laws, but allows measures or sectors to be exempt from commitments on public interest   18
grounds if done in a transparent way. The Singapore-Australia agreement is similar but 
goes a little further. The Singapore-EFTA agreement is even shorter, comprising 11 lines 
of text (in chapter 10).  
The competition policy component of these agreements can be seen as a partial 
bilateral response to the failure in the WTO to negotiate on competition policy. In the 
WTO these was considerable discussion of competition related issues following the 1996 
Singapore ministerial and prior to the launch of the Doha Round. As Bhattacharjea (2004) 
identifies, the directions proposed for a multilateral agreement in competition policies in 
these discussions included achieving investment promoting benefits of harmonized 
competition policies; actions against anti competitive practices that restrict market access 
for imports; replacement of anti-dumping arrangements by competition policies (as in the 
EU); and restrictions on cross border cartels. In the 2001 agreement to launch the round 
only part of this list survived, and this remaining part was then dropped at the 2004 
Cancun ministerial (see Bhattacharjea 2004)
23. 
Investment is dealt with in more of the country agreements than is competition 
policy and is also covered in the ASEAN agreements. There is also more commonality in 
approach, with central commitments being (either or both) National Treatment and MFN 
treatment for foreign investors (typically) alongside provisions relating to expropriation, 
compensation, and (in some cases) repatriation of earnings. 
The ASEAN – Japan and ASEAN – India agreements are virtually the same and 
contain general commitments to create a liberal and competitive environment for 
investment, to strengthen cooperation in investment, improve transparency of laws and 
                                                 
23 Bhattacharjea, A. (2004), “ Trade and Competition Policy”, Working Paper No 146 Indian Council for 
Research on International Economic Relations, Delhi.   19
regulations, and to protect investors. The ASEAN-China agreement has similar general 
provisions, but the language differs. 
The Thai-Australia agreement begins with definitions but then centers its 
liberalization commitments on most favoured nation treatment for investors, with 
separate “pre-establishment” and “post-establishment” national treatment provisions.
24 
There is then language relating to the promotion and protection of investments, and 
provisions relating to expropriation and compensation for losses as well as access to 
dispute settlement. 
These agreements show much more commonality of approach for investment than 
is the case of competition policy. There are substantive commitments, and interestingly of 
relatively similar form to those proposed for the failed Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment. In this area, regional negotiations clearly seem to be fulfilling the role of a 
partial substitute for a wider multilateral agreement between countries who were not (in 
the main) forces of resistance to a possible agreement on multilateral disciplines in the 
WTO.   
Issues related to mutual recognition in these agreements arise under a number of 
chapter headings in the various texts. Issues of product testing and standards are in 
chapters on technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions, and 
particular sectoral chapters, such as telecommunications, touch on product standards 
while chapters on services deal with recognition of professional certification. This 
treatment of mutual recognition differs substantially from the explicit pairwise country 
treaties on mutual recognition that have been negotiated in recent years. These typically 
                                                 
24 The rationale for these two separate commitments as against a single national treatment commitment is 
not clear to the present authors.    20
involve both mutual agreement to accept agreed competent authorities for the mutual 
determination of standards, and agreements on the mutual recognition of more narrowly 
specified items (such as notorial attestations, or certificates).  
The ASEAN blocwide and country agreements also deal with issues related to 
movement of persons and usually in separate chapters. This is reflective both of the 
growing significance of visa and work permit issues in the global economy and the 
absence of multilateral venues for dealing with them (see Ng and Whalley 2004).
25 In this 
case, country or regional agreements provide the platform for adding an issue under 
current discussion, but with no clear multilateral forum for discussion. Bargaining across 
issues and with it, the greater probability of achieving results presumably provides the 
rationale for this. 
The Singapore-US agreement begins with a broad statement that the preferential 
trading relationship between the parties implies comparable temporary entry with 
transparent criteria and procedures. It then proceeds to a general obligation to apply 
measures in the area so as to avoid adverse impacts or delays involving trade in goods 
and services or the conduct of investment activities under the agreement. There are then 
provisions on information exchange, transparency criteria and an agreement to appoint 
temporary entry coordinators in each country. 
The detailed substance occurs in an annex (11A) which sets out details of 
arrangements under four section headings; business visitors, traders and investors, intra-
company transfers, and professionals. In some cases, (such as business visitors) it sets out 
required documentation for entry. In other categories (professionals) there are appendices 
                                                 
25 Also, see Nielson (2002) for a recent discussion of temporary movement of persons in other recent 
bilateral agreements.   21
which set out numerical target for initial applications for entry of business persons from 
Singapore that US shall annually approve (5,400). These also specify a number of 
considerations required by US immigration laws can that the US shall not take into 
account when making entry visas.  
The ASEAN agreements also contain a range of commitments relating to 
cooperation in a number of areas. Cooperation agreements are typically vague in 
statement and it may be tempting to dismiss them as lacking in substance. But they do 
represent a commitment to a deepening of bilateral relationships and in specific and 
designated areas and hence are of substance from a process point of view.  
The stress on cooperation in the China-ASEAN agreement is manifest in the title 
of the agreement as a “Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation” indicating the significance attached to cooperation in bilateral relationship 
building in this case. There are commitments to strengthen cooperation in 5 key sectors 
(agriculture, information and communication technology, human resource development, 
investment, and Mekong River basin development).  
The ASEAN agreement with Japan and India also details many areas of 
cooperation including trade facilitation, business environment, energy, information and 
communications technology, human resource development, tourism and hospitality, 
transportation and logistics, and standards conformity and mutual recognition.  
Though inevitably vague and hard to interpret as legal text, these cooperation 
elements play a role as process in the deepening of country to country relationships in 
these agreements. For countries where sequential relationship building and deepening is 
seen as a critical way to proceed in international negotiations, the cooperation provisions   22
of these agreements can play a major role through process as far as international 
economic management is concerned. Commitments to cooperate, even if ill defined, are 
part of process and these new partnership agreements unlike traditional tariff based trade 
agreements are not typically negotiated as one off treaty arrangements by countries with 
an exclusive focus on legal provisions and detailed text.    23
 
5.  Why So many, Why so much variance inform, why coming so fast, 
and where are they headed? 
This latest wave of regional agreements which have spread so quickly through the 
trading system does not, in my view, reflect a single dominant influence. Instead, a series 
of factors need noting to account for the phenomena. 
   First, their complexity seems to reflect the relative ease of customizing agreements to 
cover non trade barrier issues in ways acceptable to the two parties so as to avoid a 
lowest common denominator outcome from common multilateral agreements. Thus, two 
countries may choose to cover, say, competition policy or investment in their pairwise 
agreement even if other countries are unwilling to negotiate in the area and bilaterally 
they can cover such an issue in a way which differs from that of any other bilateral pair. 
As such, one can argue that the attempt multilaterally in the WTO to first deal with an 
expanded agenda beyond conventional trade issues such areas as environment, 
competition policy, labor standards, and investment (the so called Singapore issues, after 
Singapore 1996), and its subsequent failure as these issues first fell in profile and then 
were withdrawn from the Doha Round agenda has resulted in renewed efforts bilaterally. 
Conventional tariff based RTA’s thus provide a convenient platform to which there non 
trade issues can also be appended bilaterally and these issues can vary from case to case.  
Second is the linkage to multilateral process. If multilateral process seems slowed or 
stalled, and in the tariff area has seemingly removed much of the room for further 
negotiation, then regional negotiation may seem the way forward. Global cooperation in 
trade may be viewed as having moved from some form of non-cooperative Nash   24
equilibrium in the 1930’s to cooperation with low tariffs (at least in the OECD) by the 
end of Uruguay Round. If multilateral cooperation subsequently  attempts to move into 
non trade areas and fails due to its complexity and its rule writing rather continuous 
instrument use limitation nature; then RTA’s can fill the void. And if attempts to revive a 
failing multilateralism involve the use of RTA’s as a form of pressure on multilateral 
process then RTAs will accelerate.  
Third is the behaviour of the large powers in the trading system. In 1947 there were no 
regional agreements. The 1957 creation of the EEC (and subsequently the EU) allowed 
by the GATT members created a regional entity. The acceptance by the US in 1987 of 
Canadian overtures for a bilateral agreement, and the demonstration that the largest 
trading entity in the system had gone regional with its largest trading partner changed 
perceptions as to the commitment of the system’s central player to multilateralism. And 
with the formation of APEC in 1994, in part as the non EU coalition to force a conclusion 
to the Uruguay Round, the central presence of regionalism in the system was clearly 
established. 
The pursuit since the early 1990’s of regional agreements by smaller powers with 
larger powers has been accelerated by demonstration that the larger powers were now 
willing to proceed regionally. The GATT as it grew after 1957 with the formation of the 
EU through the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds can be seen, in effect, as a form of bilateral 
accommodation between the two largest entities in the trading system which through 
MFN also applied to third entities most of whom had their dominant trade with either the 
US or the EU. Multilateralism in the GATT can be viewed as a peace treaty between the 
US and the EU that they would mutually extend whatever they negotiated with third   25
parties to each other. The later rise of Japan and its accommodation within this system as 
a multilateral non regional entity preserved its structure until the late 1980s. 
In the late 1980’s, things begin to change. The US first regional went with Canada, and 
then with NAFTA. The Uruguay Round proved hard to conclude and regional negotiation 
was in part used as a mechanism to try to achieve multilateral closure. The Doha Round 
then became hard to launch, and harden to conclude. The subsequent attempt to the 
broaden the bargaining in the WTO to non trade areas failed, but the demand for such 
negotiation remained. Driven by their desire to be inside blocs, smaller countries then 
seek safe haven agreements. RTAs become acceptable currency and as a platform for 
wider use their coverage grows. 
Finally comes the role of opaque RTAs in domestic and international political process, 
Negotiating RTAs provides potential significant career enhancement to negotiators, and 
long, complex and hard to interpret RTA’s even provide a collusive outcome for 
negotiators jointly seeking to advance careers. Politicians can use RTA’s domestically to 
show their activisms and publicize their achievements, even if vague and lacking in 
concreteness. In their international dialogue with each other, those in bureaucracies in 
countries can use the machinery of RTAs and all of the ongoing consultation established 
as advancement from a process point of view in trade management. 
The net result has been sharp growth and acceleration in RTA’s of the form and extent 
set out earlier. Where is the process headed? To some degree the jury is still out. If the 
content of these RTAs remains vague, the agreements primarily are diplomatic 
arrangements negotiated for geopolitical linkage rather than significant economic impact. 
But agreements do invoke substantive economic relationships and their coverage is broad.          26
Where they head may as much as anything be determined by what happens 
multilaterally. If, as most expect, the Doha Round concludes with a minimal outcome, 
dispute settlement in the WTO weakens, and multilateral disciplines are perceived to 
weaken, then regionalism as the central form of policy coordination in the system will 
grow. And if into non OECD trade continues grow at its current high rates (China is now 
India’s 2
nd largest export market), the desire for trade management of these relationships 
will grow. Weakening multilateralism seemingly inevitably leaves a growing patchwork 
quilt of regional policy cooperation as the ever more prominent component of the system.         27
6 . Conclusions 
     In this paper I seek to both characterize and assess the recent wave of regional 
agreements in the trading system which has accelerated since 2000. Nearly 400 
agreements now exist, and by 2008 according to WTO analyze a significant number of 
countries will be party to more than 30 agreements. I suggest these agreements are 
characterized by several central features; substantial diversity in form, broadened 
coverage of issues to the degree that RTAs seemingly now provide a platform to which a 
range of issues are appended; vagueness in language and commitment so that they should 
be understood as much as process agreements as mutual limitations on trade restrictions 
measures; and in may cases sharp asymmetries of partner size. 
I suggest that a number of factors account for growth in these agreements. These 
include the use of RTAs as a platform to append a range of issues for targeted bilateral 
negotiation; the failure of multilateral negotiation to extend bargaining to non trade issues 
point Uruguay Round; the prospect of limited failure multilateral process; the 
demonstration effect of large entities going regional and smaller entities seeking safe 
haven agreements with their most important large partners; and the uses of agreements by 
politicians and negotiators to demonstrate action and negotiation seeking advancement. 
I conclude by suggesting that weakened multilateralism after a minimalist conclusion 
to the Doha Round may well only accelerate this process. 
      28
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